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APPENDIX D: 
 
Technology Advisory Board Report 
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The Technology Advisory Board (TAB) solicited, evaluated, reviewed, 40 written 
submissions of technologies and drew conclusions from these submissions about the state 
of online safety technology for minors in a formal process described in detail in this 
document. The primary task was to assess whether and how the submitted technologies 
could be useful in the context of enhancing online safety for minors. 
 
In sum, the TAB review of the submitted technologies leaves us in a state of cautious 
optimism, with many submissions showing promise. The children’s online safety industry 
is evolving, and many of the technologies we reviewed were point solutions rather than 
broad attempts to address the children’s safety online as a whole. There is, however, a 
great deal of innovation in this arena as well as passionate commitment to finding 
workable, reasonable solutions from companies both large and small. Thus, the TAB 
emerged from its review process encouraged by the creativity and productivity apparent 
in this field.  
 
By the end of the review process, the TAB ultimately determined that no single 
technology reviewed could solve every aspect of online safety for minors, or even one 
aspect of it one hundred percent of the time. But clearly there is a role for technology in 
addressing this issue both now and in the future, and most likely, various technologies 
could be leveraged together to address the challenges in this arena. 
 
Some critics may object to the use of technology as a solution, given the risk of failure 
and lack of total certainty around performance. However, the TAB believes that although 
it is indeed true that even the cleverest, most robust technology can be circumvented, this 
does not necessarily mean that technology should not be deployed at all. It simply means 
that – even with deployment of the best tools and technologies available to jumpstart the 
process of enhancing safety for minors online – there is no substitute for a parent, 
caregiver, or other responsible adult actively guiding and supporting a child in safe 
Internet usage. Likewise, education is an essential part of the puzzle. Even the best 
technology or technologies should be only part of a broader solution to keeping minors 
safer online. 
 
As a corollary, the TAB also recommends that further evaluative work be conducted on 
any technology – whether or not it was among those reviewed in this process – prior to 
broadly recommending its use, given the potential for new risks and significant 
unintended consequences. The benefits of each reviewed solution need further 
exploration and balancing against monetary costs, possible privacy and security concerns 
about user information, international implications and applicability, as well as other 
issues. Additionally, determining which technology or set of technologies will work best 
for a particular child, family, school, community, or any other context in which the safety 
of minors on the Internet is an immediate concern will always be a highly individualized 
decision. It is also not a decision that can reasonably be made without a great deal of 
familiarity with the situation in which a technology solution would function.  
 
2 Listed here, and discussed in greater detail later in this document, are the specific 
conclusions and recommendations generated by the TAB’s review process: 
 
•  Technology can play a role but cannot be the sole input to improved safety for 
minors online.  
 
•  The most effective technology solution is likely to be a combination of 
technologies. 
 
•  Any and every technology solution has its limitations. 
 
•  Youth online safety measures must be balanced against concerns for the 
privacy and security of user information, especially information on minors.  
 
•  For maximum impact, client-side-focused technologies should be priced to 
enable all would-be users to purchase and deploy them.  
 
•  A common standard for sharing information among safety technologies would 
be useful. 
 
•  Developing standard metrics for youth online safety solutions would be useful.  
 
3 INTRODUCTION 
 
The scope of the Technology Advisory Board’s mandate in conducting its work for the 
Task Force was to review all submissions that it received detailing technology solutions 
for improved online safety for minors. To conduct its work, the TAB was limited to the 
written submission itself, written responses to several questions, and public presentations 
made to the Task Force. The TAB did not perform uniform, independent technical 
evaluations of the technologies submitted. 
 
Based on these inputs, we discuss broad sets of technology categories that address several 
online safety concerns involving minors. For each category, we summarize how the 
technologies address one or more aspects of online safety for minors, the potential 
benefits of the approach, and hurdles that it must overcome to be effective.  
 
PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Technology Advisory Board Members and Observers 
The Technology Advisory Board comprised two teams: the TAB Members and the TAB 
Observers. The TAB Members team was charged with the formal review of the 
technology submissions from third parties. The TAB Observers team was asked to 
formally comment on any or all of the submissions if they so chose, but, due to potential 
conflicts of interest, their comments were neither part of the formal technology reviews 
nor part of the recommendation process to select presenters for the Berkman ISTTF 
Public Meeting.  
 
The objective in building the TAB teams was to enlist people who had deep technology 
backgrounds, domain expertise in a field related to the Task Force’s work, and a 
demonstrated professional interest in relevant subject areas. In addition to technology 
professionals, we also added representatives from other related fields to serve as 
Observers, so that we could draw on their areas of expertise. An additional distinction 
between Members and Observers is that Observers might have conflicts of interest with 
the review work. 
 
Nominations for both Members and Observers came from the Task Force itself, the Task 
Force team at the Berkman Center, other Berkman Center affiliates, and other TAB 
Members and Observers. The nominations were vetted through the Berkman Task Force 
team, an interview and investigation of possible conflicts of interest were conducted, and 
then the Berkman Task Force team made the decision whether to invite the nominee to 
join the TAB Members or Observers team. 
 
TAB Members (Complete biographies are included as Exhibit 1) 
Ben Adida, Harvard Medical School, Harvard University 
Scott Bradner, Harvard University 
Laura DeBonis, Berkman Center, Harvard University 
Hany Farid, Dartmouth 
Lee Hollaar, University of Utah 
4 Todd Inskeep, Bank of America 
Brian Levine, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Adi Mcabian, Twistbox 
RL Morgan, University of Washington 
Lam Nguyen, Stroz Friedberg, LLC 
Jeff Schiller, MIT 
Danny Weitzner, MIT 
 
TAB Observers (Complete biographies are included as Exhibit 1) 
Rachna Dhamija, Usable Security Systems 
Evie Kintzer, WGBH 
Al Marcella, Webster University 
John Morris, Center for Democracy and Technology 
Teresa Piliouras, Polytechnic University 
Greg Rattray, Delta-Risk 
Jeff Schmidt, Consultant 
John Shehan, National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
 
Soliciting, collecting, and evaluating submissions 
 
Soliciting 
The process for soliciting submissions was as follows: the TAB created a Submission 
Template that encompassed the various questions anticipated for any single technology. 
Primary areas for response included: (1) functional goals that a technology attempted to 
address; (2) technological detail about the technology itself; and (3) financial and other 
business information about the technology to inform the assessment of viability and 
functionality. On July 1, 2008, the Submission Template was posted to the Task Force’s 
webpage on the Berkman website and made broadly available for download by any 
company, individual, or other entity that wished to submit, in writing only, a technology 
for consideration. (The Submission Template is included as Exhibit 2.) 
 
The public was made aware of the Template through a Berkman Center press release and 
by tapping into various networks, including networks of the Berkman Center staff and 
affiliates, the TAB, and the members of the Task Force.  
 
The deadline for submission was July 21, 2008, approximately three weeks after the 
Template was made publicly available. 
 
Collecting 
In total, the TAB received 40 written submissions from 38 companies. (An additional 
submission involving a registry for minors’ email addresses was withdrawn from 
consideration by the submitting company.) Submitters were asked to include with their 
submission a statement indicating that they understood the Intellectual Property policy 
regarding submission to the Task Force. (The Intellectual Property policy is included as 
Exhibit 3.) 
 
5 Evaluating 
The TAB designed and the Berkman Task Force team approved an evaluation process 
that closely followed the model of other scientific reviews; in particular, that of the 
National Science Foundation review. Three to five TAB Members reviewed each 
document. Following initial discussions of the document, questions were sent to the 
submitting companies to clarify our understanding of their submission. All companies 
responded to the follow-up questions. Final review discussions considered the answers to 
the follow-up questions as well as all TAB Observer Comments. After final review 
discussions, recommendations were made to the Berkman Task Force team for 
companies to present at the Public Meeting of the Task Force. Many criteria were 
involved in determining whether a submitting company was asked to present at the Public 
Meeting. A recommendation to have a company present was not an endorsement of the 
technology. Rather, the TAB sought to have a variety of technologies, companies, and 
approaches discussed; to show the range of ideas extant; to inform the public; and to help 
foster meaningful dialogue about solutions to improving online safety for minors.  
 
Evaluation questions were circulated to the Members of the TAB prior to their initial 
reading of the submissions. Members were asked to use the questions to frame their 
thinking in preparation for review discussions. The evaluation questions included:  
•  What functional requirements are met by the submission? 
 
•  What is the overall approach? 
•  Who is the target audience (e.g., youth under 13, teens, parents)? 
•  What is the target system (e.g., social networking sites, cell phones, ISPs)? 
•  What underlying assumptions does the proposal make? Are they reasonable? 
•  Does the approach require education and/or parental involvement? 
•  What are the strengths and weakness of the approach? 
•  How well does the product actually address its targeted function? 
•  What are unintended consequences caused by use of the product? 
•  Under what circumstances would the product fail? How often?  
•  What are the consequences of product failure? 
•  What other trade-offs does the product present? 
•  How does product work internationally? 
•  How does product work with different business models? 
 
To facilitate the review process, the TAB created a list of functional goals related to 
online safety for minors that a technology might address. This list was included as one of 
the sections in the Submission Template and each company self-identified one or more of 
eight functional goals for the technology. For the purposes of review, the different 
solutions submitted were clustered according to these functional goals: 
 
•  Limit harmful contact between adults and minors 
•  Limit harmful contact between minors 
•  Limit/prevent minors from accessing inappropriate content on the Internet 
6 •  Limit/prevent minors from creating inappropriate content on the Internet 
•  Limit the availability of illegal content on the Internet 
•  Prevent minors from accessing particular sites without parental consent 
•  Prevent harassment, unwanted solicitation, and bullying of minors on the Internet 
•  Other – please specify 
 
In addition to self-identification of functional goals, after review, the TAB also assigned 
one of five categories to each of the 40 technology submissions. Occasionally more than 
one category applied to a technology; in such situations, the primary category was the 
one with which the technology was associated.  
 
The technology categories, with number of submissions received in parentheses, are:  
 
1.  Age Verification/Identity Authentication (17) 
2.  Filtering/Monitoring/Auditing (13) 
3.  Text Analysis (5) 
4.  Biometrics (1) (+2 with biometrics as secondary category) 
5.  Other (4) 
A list of all submissions in alphabetical order is included as Exhibit 4. The submissions 
themselves as well as TAB Observer Comments are available on the Task Force’s 
website. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Among past efforts to survey the landscape of children’s online safety technologies, the 
2000 COPA Commission report is one of the most relevant. For purposes of brevity we 
do not summarize or cite COPA or other previous reviews of technologies in our analyses 
below. The TAB does recognize, however, the importance of previous work in this area. 
Our intention with this review process is to complement previous work and not to 
supersede it.   
 
Below we summarize the categories of technology solutions presented, comment 
occasionally on particular technologies, and discuss overall the strengths and weaknesses 
of each category in application to enhancing online safety for minors. In each category, 
some solutions help a little bit and some help more extensively. The same is true of each 
category of technology. We considered each proposal from the perspective of what the 
potential outcome would be if it were fully implemented and widely adopted. Again, no 
one solution can solve the entire youth online safety problem, but it was clear from the 
submissions that there has been excellent traction achieved.  
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Age Verification/Identity Authentication 
Category Description 
 
Age verification technologies seek primarily to verify the age of adults and children, 
while and identity technologies seek to verify individual identities. The primary goal of 
these technologies is to utilize age as a mechanism for limiting inappropriate contact 
between children and adults as well as preventing access by minors to inappropriate 
content. Although some technologies attempt to verify age/identity remotely, other 
technologies rely on a trusted third party for verification (e.g., schools, notaries, or 
government agencies). A submission in this category involving a registry of minors’ 
email addresses was withdrawn from consideration by the submitting company.  
 
We separated technology submissions in this area into four subcategories: 
 
1.  Comparison against records collected from public databases.  Many records, both 
public and private, are available about adults, including information from credit 
reports, criminal history, and real estate transfers. These disparate records can be 
aggregated into a portfolio of data about an individual. This information can then 
be used, among other applications, as a basis to present challenge questions to 
individuals to ensure their correct identification.  
 
2.  Comparison against records collected by schools or other public entities. Records 
about children are difficult for third parties to collect. This subcategory of 
submissions commonly relies on schools or other public entities (e.g., a post 
office or DMV) to verify the age of a child through a designee. Permission of the 
parents/child is required for initial access to and use of these records. 
 
3.  Peer-based verification, which allows peers in a community to vote, recommend, 
or rate whether a person is in an appropriate age group based on relationships and 
personal knowledge established offline.  
 
4.  Biometrics. Biometric solutions involve using an individual’s inherent 
characteristics, such as physiological traits or facial images, to verify age. These 
solutions are discussed in the biometrics section of this document. 
 
Commentary 
 
•  In general, some submissions attempt to make it more difficult for minors to 
pretend to be adults, while others focus on making it more difficult for adults to 
pretend to be minors. Rarely does one technology address both problems.  
 
•  Typically, these technologies do make it more difficult for a minor to pose as an 
adult to whom they are not related or acquainted. Similarly, they also typically 
make it harder for an adult to pose as a minor who is not a family member or is 
otherwise unknown to them.  
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•  Many of these technologies are designed primarily for the United States context 
and may not functionally optimally in international contexts.  
 
•  Peer-based methods suffer from the same basic limitation seen in many an online 
poll or online peer-rated merchant sites: users can vote as many times as they 
wish to artificially raise or lower a peer rating. Additionally, if left unchecked, 
users can even create multiple identities to perform the extra voting themselves. 
Finally, even if all identities in the system are real and unique, minors might 
organize against another minor in their ratings or recommendations in an online 
form of bullying increasingly known as cyberbullying. 
 
•  Comparison against public records is only as effective as the completeness and 
data quality of the public database. This approach is more suitable to verifying the 
age of adults as public records of minors range from quite limited to nonexistent. 
There are also significant privacy concerns when institutions that hold the records 
of minors (e.g., schools) are involved. 
 
•  The public entity–based approach, though appealing in terms of the accuracy of 
its data, has significant challenges from a practical perspective. Resources, 
incentives, legal liability and basic infrastructure are each nontrivial potential 
hurdles to achieving scale with this solution. For example, the coordination and 
participation of thousands of public entities (often resource-constrained already) 
would be a significant operational challenge on the aggregator side.  
 
•  More generally, in all of these approaches, the user receives digital credentials 
after verification that can be used across sessions without reverifying. These 
credentials, which are usually protected by only a user name and password, are 
easy to transfer from adult to child or from child to adult. Further, they can be 
sold, traded cooperatively, or taken under duress.  
 
•  The working assumption for technologies in this category is that age- or identity-
related deception is at the center of sexual solicitation on the Internet. Some 
emerging research, such as that documented by the Task Force's Research 
Advisory Board, suggests that this may not be the central issue in online sexual 
solicitation. Thus, although these types of solutions do target potential risks, they 
may not target the most critical issues that underlie Internet-based sexual 
solicitation. 
 
•  Finally, there are significant potential privacy concerns and security issues given 
the type and amount of data aggregated and collected by the technology solutions 
in this category, each needing to be thoughtfully addressed and well-managed. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
Age verification and identity authentication technologies are appealing in concept but 
challenged in terms of effectiveness. Any system that relies on remote verification of 
information has potential for inaccuracies. For example, on the user side, it is never 
certain that the person attempting to verify an identity is using their own actual identity or 
someone else’s. Any system that relies on public records has a better likelihood of 
accurately verifying an adult than a minor due to extant records. Any system that focuses 
on third-party in-person verification would require significant political backing and social 
acceptance. Additionally, any central repository of this type of personal information 
would raise significant privacy concerns and security issues. 
 
Filtering/Monitoring/Auditing 
Category Description 
 
Filtering, monitoring and auditing solutions attempt either to prevent a user from 
accessing inappropriate content or provide a monitoring mechanism to document this 
activity after it occurs. These tools are based on a set of predetermined criteria that allow 
dynamic monitoring of web content and on-the-fly determination of the appropriate level 
of access. They are usually software-based and installed on a user’s computer. They can 
often be packaged with logging features that allow an individual to review prior Internet 
activity on the computer. Historically, filtering, monitoring, and auditing tools have 
enjoyed widespread success and have been in use by parents, schools, and other public 
venues in which Internet restrictions are appropriate.  
 
Filtering, monitoring, and auditing tools are generally divided into two categories: client-
side and server-side.  
 
•  Client-side software is installed locally on the user's computer and is maintained 
by the user. Its effectiveness is dependent on the user’s installation, configuration, 
regular maintenance, and use of the software. Client-side filtering tools are very 
popular and have been deployed for over a decade. They are relatively 
straightforward to implement and offer parents and guardians an easy way to 
provide a safer Internet environment.  
 
•  In the server-side approaches reviewed by the TAB, filtering of inappropriate 
content is performed before the content reaches a user’s computer and is bounded 
by the standards of the website or service platform itself. (As a note, “server-side 
filtering” is often used to refer to content filtering at the ISP level. The TAB 
received no submissions for ISP-level filtering products.) For example, a social 
network site can filter – or flag – user-generated content that is deemed 
inappropriate for some users. Thus, a website’s policy, rather than individual 
user’s preferences, dictates the level of appropriateness, with the scope limited to 
just that site.  
 
10 Commentary 
 
•  Client-side filtering can be effective as a complementary solution to other 
technologies, is readily deployable by a parent or responsible adult, and is 
reasonably easy to use. A possible downside of client-side filtering may be that it 
might provide users with the illusion of total safety and problem prevention and 
thereby reduce critical adult vigilance and involvement. Additionally, costs may 
prevent families from choosing this option. 
 
•  The effectiveness of a filtering tool may vary based on its design and amount of 
user control. Some filters do analysis on the fly, and some filters are based on a 
predetermined set of criteria. For this latter group, their restrictions vary greatly 
based on the software manufacturer. Overly restrictive tools can filter out too 
much information, leaving its users frustrated and resulting in a reversion to less 
restrictive settings, and thereby exposure to greater risk.  
 
•  Some filtering tools address all Internet technologies, but some do not. For 
example, one package can restrict access to inappropriate websites but still allow 
unfiltered conversations to occur over instant messaging programs. Finally, 
although many programs offer users a varying degree of control over what they 
filter, frequently filtering software makes decisions that rely on its own criteria, 
not that of the parents, limiting parents’ control over what they deem appropriate.  
 
•  Commonly, these filters can detect certain types of inappropriate content, but the 
focus of filtering software is more on prevention of access to pornographic 
content than it is to violent images and video or content involving self-harm. 
These tools also function more accurately with text and images than with video 
and audio. For continued effectiveness, it is critical that filtering tools must 
constantly adapt to the constant changes in Internet technologies.   
 
•  Though relatively easy to implement, filtering tools typically require a software 
purchase and enough technological ability to install the application. Additionally, 
they require the time and understanding to properly configure the software for the 
appropriate age level and often require regular updates via the Internet. The issue 
here is that responsible adults may not be computer-literate enough to be 
comfortable with installation, configuration, and updates, which may ultimately 
put minors at risk.  
 
•  Filtering software can be easily circumvented or disabled by computer-savvy 
users, completely eliminating their effectiveness. Frequently, parents or guardians 
are notified in such cases, which is beneficial.  In any case, parents, guardians, 
and other caregivers should simply be alert to the potential for circumvention. 
 
•  Server-side filtering, though appealing for its ease of use, presents concerns about 
potential lack of parental control over access to content and also, at the extreme, 
about potential censorship. 
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•  Auditing software typically requires regular commitment from parents or other 
responsible adults for effectiveness. The benefit and the challenge of auditing 
software is the potentially vast amount of data captured about a minor’s online 
activity. This data, however, requires some sort of adult review, commonly 
available in summary fashion, for actual efficacy. There is limited impact on 
online safety for minors from using auditing software without the ongoing 
attention of a responsible adult. 
 
•  To make auditing more manageable, monitoring software often stores activity 
logs in a central location owned by the software provider. These records are 
therefore potentially at risk for compromise by hackers, have the potential to be 
sold to third parties seeking marketing data, and have other privacy and security 
issues as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Filtering, monitoring and auditing software can provide parents and other supervisory 
adults with a useful tool to assist in determining and limiting user access to certain types 
of inappropriate Internet content. Although not a total solution for minors’ online safety, 
the effective use of these types of tools can be a key part of a holistic solution whereby 
parental involvement, adult supervision, and software tools work together to provide a 
safer Internet environment.   
 
Text Analysis 
Category Description 
 
Text-based analysis technologies are designed to automatically detect predatory, 
harassing, or otherwise inappropriate conversations on the Internet. These solutions 
generally work by obtaining samples of the conversations to be detected, extracting a 
statistical signature from these conversations, and classifying them based on the 
measured statistic. Text analysis tools vary in their deployment schemes, ranging from 
local installation at Internet cafes, libraries, and other public access sites to large-scale 
deployments across an entire social network website. Some solutions even incorporate 
the automated analysis as part of a parental auditing tool, locally operating on a home 
computer. 
 
Commentary 
 
•  Automated text analysis can be quite useful against inappropriate interactions 
including online harassment, sexual solicitation, and other types of problematic 
communications, as it primarily focuses on language and highlights potential 
problems early.  
 
•  Given the sheer volume of online interactions and communications, the 
development of automated techniques for analyzing text conversations seems 
12 quite reasonable. To be effective, however, it is crucial that a statistically valid 
sample of representative text be collected to use as a baseline. There are two 
challenges to this sampling effort: millions of text-based messages are exchanged 
across the Internet every day, so not only does obtaining a valid “going forward” 
sample present a challenge, but retrospectively acquiring and tracking data to 
adequately identify an escalating situation would also be complicated. 
 
•  An area for further development for text analysis technologies is error rate. The 
current typical error rate in analyzing contextual text is problematic. Not enough 
research has been done yet to determine the impact of known error rates. It is 
likely that any large-scale implementation of text analysis technology would 
produce far too many false positives at this point in time, and would require 
additional, nonscalable manual effort to identify illicit behavior. An additional 
risk is that legitimate users may be denied access to Internet-based services that 
automatically blacklist users based on criteria. The problem also exists in the 
reverse. A low rate of positive identification can minimize the dangers posed on 
the Internet, provide a false sense of security, and actually endanger the 
individuals it intends to protect.  
 
•  International environments such as the Internet also present challenges to 
automated text analysis technology. The proposed solutions currently seemed 
unlikely to scale to encompass the wide variety of languages, colloquial dialects, 
and conversational styles present on the Internet and probably essential over time 
to effective text analysis. Effective systems must also evolve to take into account 
the various ways in which users try to circumvent the filters by altering their 
linguistic patterns. 
 
•  The automated text analysis technologies submitted presented some potential 
privacy and security concerns, particularly in the cases in which a tool proposed 
to track and store historical data on its servers. Internet users would be 
unwittingly subjected to intrusions on what may be legitimate and private 
conversations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Text analysis technologies overall seemed to be a promising category of technology 
solution for improving online safety for minors, but the slate of submissions in this 
category were in a relatively early stage of development at this time. To accommodate for 
current shortcomings, certain implementations of automated text analysis could still be 
effective. Situations in which a parent uses the technology as a complement to other 
filtering, monitoring, and auditing activities may assist in the supervision of a child on the 
Internet. Schools and other public institutions that provide clear notice to its users, deploy 
the tool locally as part of an overall security program, and use consistent standards to 
manually review the text after identification may also find it useful. Lastly, websites that 
deploy the solution as part of an active monitoring and supervision program may find it 
assists in reducing the need for manual oversight. Although these benefits may outweigh 
13 possible concerns, it is incumbent on an entity to thoroughly test and understand the 
limitations of the tool prior to its deployment and, overall, the TAB felt that text analysis 
tools needed to evolve a bit further prior to widespread deployment and usage. 
 
Biometrics 
Category Description 
 
Biometric technologies attempt to identify an individual or class of individuals based 
upon intrinsic physical (e.g., fingerprint, iris, or DNA) or behavioral traits (e.g., walking 
gate or typing style). Significant research has gone into the development of biometric 
technologies and some have been deployed in limited commercial settings.  
 
These tools often use a hardware-based device to accept and transmit certain biometric 
information through the computer. In one instance, a device attempts to determine an 
individual’s age grouping based on a bone density analysis of that individual’s hand. 
Another tool attempts to actually identify a specific individual through facial recognition 
and match the individual to a known sex offender database. Others are still more novel in 
their approach, attempting to identify specific individuals through the analysis of a user’s 
typing behavior and patterns.  
 
In each instance, information is gathered by either the hardware or software tool and 
submitted to determine the appropriateness of an individual using a particular service. 
The website or web service employing this solution incorporates the safeguard in their 
system and where necessary, requires the user to purchase the biometric device for their 
computer.  
 
Commentary 
 
•  In limited situations, biometric techniques may provide a solution to assisting in 
limiting inappropriate contact between adults and minors. These solutions, 
however, are challenged with problems that can undermine their usefulness in 
addition to being expensive to deploy.  
 
•  Biometric solutions typically require supervision to be effective. A situation in 
which individuals are expected to self-identify through the use of a biometric 
device over the Internet is, at best, suboptimal. Individuals can obfuscate a facial 
image through the use of varied lighting, facial hair, and other indistinguishable 
features. Typing styles and patterns can vary drastically depending on the type of 
keyboard, the use of voice-recognition software, and an almost unlimited number 
of variables from computer to computer. Bad actors can use their own children or 
other individuals to submit false readings. The challenges to positive, accurate 
identification are numerous, especially in Internet-based deployments in which an 
individual is not monitored while using their biometric device.  
 
•  Accuracy rates are critical for effectiveness. The level of accuracy in the 
submitted tools has not yet been proven and could be problematic, resulting in 
14 potential denial of access for legitimate users to a particular website or web 
service. 
 
•  The working assumption of biometric technologies is that identity deception is at 
the root of online safety problems. Although this may be true in some percentage 
of cases, the research documented by the Task Force’s Research Advisory Board 
suggests that deception is not the central issue in online safety for minors.  
 
•  Any biometric system raises important privacy concerns and security issues, 
particularly if the biometric data is transmitted or stored on a central server, 
presenting challenges to both user and business adoption. Biometric data is, by 
law, considered Personally Identifying Information (PII). Servers holding large 
amounts of PII pose a serious security risk and would be a likely target for 
information theft. The retention and security of this data would present a 
significant business liability and might have a deterrent effect on potential users. 
It is possible that business risk alone would likely deter any wide scale adoption, 
without legislation or mandate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Biometric solutions certainly have some appeal, if proven effective, and show some 
promise, should they continue to evolve. At present, however, there are significant 
challenges to widespread usage and adoption for a variety of reasons including accuracy 
and detection rates and a need for supervision.  
 
Other: Individual Identification  
Category Description 
 
Submissions in the category focused on identifying or profiling individuals who have 
been convicted of sex offenses, for example by aggregating data from registered sex 
offender databases or by tracking devices and computers of registered sex offenders. 
These technologies then enable a website to block or otherwise prevent the individuals 
profiled from accessing a site or areas on a site.  
 
Commentary 
 
•  Profiling systems are only as effective as the data they use. Not all potential 
problem users have been previously identified or registered in the sex offender 
database or other watchlists; thus, a system relying on such data will be inherently 
limited. 
 
•  Basing a technology solution on user-provided information is a challenge to the 
accuracy of any technology. It is not clear that adequate incentive exists for a user 
to provide accurate information in this context. Further, acquiring and using 
invalid personal information is a trivial exercise. 
 
15 •  Solutions that require a computer to be used by a single user only for 
effectiveness will have limited deployment options and limited effectiveness in a 
world where public computers with Internet access are fairly widely available. 
Libraries, schools, and even households can have many users that may have 
completely different intentions.  
 
•  Identification systems require high accuracy rates for effectiveness and adoption. 
Problematic accuracy rates may result in legitimate users potentially being denied 
access to a particular web site or service. For example, a user who shares a name 
or identifying information with someone in a Registered Sex Offender database 
might be inappropriately denied access. 
 
•  With the use of personal information essential to the functioning of many of these 
systems, robust data privacy and security policies and technology are critical to 
their success. 
 
Conclusion 
These profiling technologies represent very specific point solutions, each with its 
particular challenges to effectiveness but also with potentially positive benefits to usage. 
Should accuracy issues be addressed, these types of technologies could probably be 
deployed in concert with other complementary technologies to improve online safety 
concerns for minors. 
 
CASE STUDY: icouldbe.org 
 
Although icouldbe.org did not propose an explicit technology solution, but rather a 
general description of their enterprise, they presented a complete approach to ensuring 
safe interactions between teenagers and adults in their secure online community. 
Specifically, icouldbe.org pairs underserved teenage students with adult mentors who aid 
students in career development, education planning, and general mentoring. All 
student/mentor interactions occur online, and icouldbe.org goes to great efforts to ensure 
that students and mentors do not interact outside of their website or have any type of 
personal or physical contact. To do so, icouldbe.org has implemented a number of 
complementary technologies, achieving what appears to be – so far, at least – a successful 
and effective secure community. These technologies include text-based filtering to make 
sure that email addresses, personal URLs, telephone numbers, or other personal 
identifying information are not included in any correspondence between the mentee and 
mentor. Additionally, icouldbe.org does extensive verification and background searches 
on all mentors to allow only appropriate adults to interact with minors. 
 
The TAB was impressed not only with the goals of icouldbe.org but also with the end-to-
end solution that they have implemented. Although the scale or their community is 
considerably smaller than the large social network sites and the goals of their online 
community are fundamentally different, we believe that icouldbe.org could serve as a 
model for the effective implementation of complementary technologies to enhance online 
safety for minors. 
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At the end of the review process, the TAB was overall encouraged by the innovation and 
energy apparent in this emergent technology area. Although no single technology 
provided a total solution to the various online safety problems facing minors as identified 
by the Research Advisory Board, each solution had some merit and some solutions could 
help a great deal. Further, it is clear that technology can play a role in keeping minors 
safer online by limiting sexual solicitation, online harassment, and access to problematic 
content, but it is also clear that technology alone is not enough given the nature of the 
challenges at hand. We are hopeful that the submitted technologies and any others in 
development will continue to evolve and improve in conjunction with progress on 
sociological fronts to optimize the mitigation of risks to minors on the Internet. We offer 
some concluding thoughts and recommendations below as a result of our review process.  
 
Technology can play a role but cannot be the sole input to improved safety for minors 
online. Although Internet technology presents great benefits in terms of education, access 
to knowledge, and commerce, it of course allows social contacts and interactions that are 
not as easily monitored as on a supervised playground or other public space. Fortunately, 
with a combination of effective child and parent education, regular parental involvement 
or involvement by other responsible adults, continuing and increasing corporate 
responsibility, and some key software tools and technologies used in complement, we can 
as a society work to address online safety for minors more effectively. 
 
The most effective technology solution is likely to be a combination of technologies. To 
the degree that online safety for minors can be addressed by technology on a standalone 
basis, the most comprehensive solution will likely require a several technologies working 
together in concert. Many of the submitted technologies were point solutions, addressing 
a part but not all aspects of safety for minors online. There was no single, all-
encompassing solution, but this is not surprising, as online safety for minors is a 
multifaceted problem. Deploying complementary technology layers or using them in an 
end-to-end fashion will enhance the impact of any one single technology and will serve to 
maximize possible effectiveness.   
 
Any and every technology solution has its limitations. No technology should be assumed 
to be foolproof upon deployment. In the realm of Internet safety, this is particularly true, 
as bad actors are likely to be especially motivated to circumvent technologies and as the 
stakes are extremely high. Further, some of the technologies can be circumvented as 
easily as a bad actor simply obtaining previously authorized credentials from an 
unsuspecting child.  
 
Youth online safety measures must be balanced against concerns for the privacy and 
security of user information, especially information on minors. For virtually all 
submissions, regardless of the functional goal or type of technology, the storage and 
potential exposure of personal information were a potential concern. It is critical that 
appropriate privacy and security measures be implemented so that this amassed user 
17 information is secure. Further, it is also important to understand the trade-off between 
potentially enhanced safety and the potential cost and precedent of providing private 
information – particularly on minors – to a possibly vulnerable or unreliable third party. 
 
For maximum impact, client-side-focused technologies should be priced to enable all 
potential users to purchase and deploy them. Price points were frequently unclear or as 
yet unset from many of the submitted technologies. We would strongly urge innovative 
thinking in how to make client-side technologies as affordable as possible. Doing so will 
not only encourage and enable adoption by anyone concerned by children’s online safety 
and wishing to make technology part of their individualized solution, but will also 
generally encourage broad adoption, which can be critical to the effectiveness of some 
client-side technologies.  
 
A common standard for sharing information among safety technologies would help. 
There is currently no open standard for sharing information voluntarily between users, 
sites, and third-party vendors interested in improving online safety for minors. It would 
be useful if an open data standard were defined for communication among the various 
classes of tools produced by different companies. This open standard should be 
developed with the participation of vendors, but without assuming specific server- or 
client-side technique and with a goal of protecting the privacy of users. To clarify, here is 
an example: using the standard, a server-based data-mining tool could flag conversations 
by sending data to the child’s computer; a parental-oversight tool might then be able to 
process this data to alert the parents. Development of this common standard would be an 
excellent next step in enhancing online safety for minors. 
 
Developing standard metrics for youth online safety solutions would be useful. 
Standard metrics would assist in the assessment of the relative merits and trade-offs of 
any potential technology solution. Development of these metrics – no doubt a challenging 
process – would be an excellent next step in this process of seeking to enhance safety for 
minors online. 
 
Respectfully submitted to the Internet Safety Technical Task Force  
on behalf of the Technology Advisory Board. 
 
Laura DeBonis, Chair, Technology Advisory Board 
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TAB MEMBER BIOGRAPHIES  
  
BEN ADIDA, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
  
Ben Adida is a member of the Faculty at Harvard Medical School and at the Children's Hospital  
Informatics Program, as well as a research fellow with the Center for Research on Computation  
and Society with the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. His research is  
focused on security and privacy of health data, the security of web applications, and the design of  
secure voting systems.  
  
Dr. Adida completed his PhD at MIT in the Cryptography and Information Security group. He is  
the Creative Commons representative to the W3C, working on interoperable web data as chair of  
the RDF-in-HTML task force. Previously, he co-founded two software startups that developed  
database-backed web application platforms based on free/open-source software.  
  
SCOTT BRADNER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
  
Scott Bradner has been involved in the design, operation and use of data networks at Harvard  
University since the early days of the ARPANET. He was involved in the design of the original  
Harvard data networks, the Longwood Medical Area network (LMAnet) and New England  
Academic and Research Network (NEARnet). He was founding chair of the technical committees  
of LMAnet, NEARnet and the COrporation for Research and Enterprise Network (CoREN).  
  
Mr. Bradner served in a number of roles in the IETF.  He was the co-director of the Operational  
Requirements Area (1993-1997), IPng Area (1993-1996), Transport Area (1997-2003) and Sub-  
IP Area (2001-2003). He was a member of the IESG (1993-2003) and was an elected trustee of  
the Internet Society (1993-1999), where he currently serves as the Secretary to the Board of  
Trustees.  Scott is also a trustee of the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN).  
  
Mr. Bradner is the University Technology Security Officer in the Harvard University Office of the  
Provost.  He tries to help the University community deal with technology-related privacy and  
security issues. He also provides technical advice and guidance on issues relating to the Harvard  
data networks and new technologies to Harvard's CIO. He founded the Harvard Network Device  
Test Lab, is a frequent speaker at technical conferences, a weekly columnist for Network World,  
and does a bit of independent consulting on the side.  
  
  
LAURA DEBONIS, BERKMAN CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
  
Laura DeBonis (Berkman Affiliate for the Internet Safety Technical Task Force). Laura chairs the  
Technology Advisory Board, which has been asked to assess the range of technology tools that  
may be used to promote online safety for minors. Laura was, most recently, the Director for  
Library Partnerships for Book Search at Google.  During her time at the company, she also  
worked on the launch teams for AdSense Online and Froogle and managed global operations in  
the early days of Book Search.  Prior to Google, Laura worked at Organic Online, consulting for a  
variety of companies on their web strategies and design.  Before attending graduate school, she  
spent a number of years working in documentary film, video and interactive multimedia, creating  
content for PBS, cable channels, and museums.  Laura is a graduate of Harvard College and has  
an MBA from Harvard Business School.  
  
HANY FARID, DARTMOUTH    
Hany Farid received his undergraduate degree in Computer Science and Applied Mathematics  
from the University of Rochester in 1989. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the  
University of Pennsylvania in 1997. Following a two year post-doctoral position in Brain and  
Cognitive Sciences at MIT, he joined the Dartmouth faculty in 1999. Hany is the David T.  
McLaughlin Distinguished Professor of Computer Science and Associate Chair of Computer  
Science. He is also affiliated with the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth.  
Hany is the recipient of an NSF CAREER award, a Sloan Fellowship and a Guggenheim  
Fellowship.  
  
From working with federal law enforcement agencies on digital forensics, to the digital  
reconstruction of Ancient Egyptian tombs, Hany works and plays with digital media at the  
crossroads of computer science, engineering, mathematics, optics, and psychology.  
  
LEE HOLLAAR, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH  
  
Lee A. Hollaar is a Professor in the School of Computing (formerly the Department of Computer  
Science) at the University of Utah in Salt Lake City. He has taught a variety of software and  
hardware courses, and currently teaches computer networking, operating systems, and  
intellectual property and computer law.  
  
He played a major role in adding two words to the vocabulary of intellectual property law:  
 * "Inducement" was recognized by the Supreme Court in its unanimous Grokster opinion. The  
concept of liability for inducement of copyright infringement was revitalized in his paper Sony  
Revisited: A new look at contributory copyright infringement, and refined in his amicus brief in the  
case. The paper also led to the introduction of the Induce Act in the 108th Congress.  
 * "Foreseeability" as a limit on doctrine of equivalents in patent law is the heart of the Supreme  
Court's Festo. It was proposed in the amicus brief whose filing he supervised as chair of IEEE-  
USA's intellectual property committee.  
  
Professor Hollaar was on sabbatical leave in Washington, DC, during the 1996-97 academic  
year, as a Committee Fellow in the intellectual property unit of the Committee on the Judiciary of  
the United States Senate, where he worked on patent reform legislation, database protection, and  
what eventually became the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. He has been a special master,  
technical expert, or consultant in a number of copyright, patent, and trade secret cases.  
  
Professor Hollaar was one of the drafters of the Utah Digital Signature Act, which made Utah the  
first government in the world to recognize digital signatures as equivalent to handwritten ones. On  
November 19, 1997, as part of Utah's Digital Signature Day, Professor Hollaar executed the first  
legally-recognized digitally-signed will in the world.  
  
He received his BS degree in electrical engineering in 1969 from the Illinois Institute of  
Technology, and his PhD in computer science in 1975 from the University of Illinois at Urbana-  
Champaign. Dr. Hollaar was on the faculty of the University of Illinois prior to joining the faculty of  
the University of Utah in 1980.  
  
TODD INSKEEP, BANK OF AMERICA  
  
Todd Inskeep has over 20 years of Information Security and Internet experience ranging from  
secure radio and desktop systems to Security Architecture and eCommerce Authentication  
strategy at Bank of America. He’s a Certified Information Systems Security Professional with a  
Master’s in Strategic Intelligence currently leading work on the Bank’s overall eCommerce/ATM  
strategy.   He also teaches security & risk management part-time at the University of North  
Carolina at Charlotte’s NSA-Designated Center of Excellence in Information Assurance.  Todd  holds a BS in Electrical Engineering from West Virginia University and a MS in Strategic  
Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College.  
  
BRIAN LEVINE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST  
  
Brian Neil Levine is an Associate Professor in the Dept. of Computer Science at the Univ. of  
Massachusetts Amherst, which he joined in 1999. He received MS and PhD degrees in Computer  
Engineering from the Univ. of California, Santa Cruz in 1996 and 1999, respectively. His research  
focuses on networking and security, and he has published over 60 papers on these topics.   In  
the networking area, his research focuses on mobile systems and peer-to-peer networking. In the  
security area, his research is focused on privacy and forensics. His lab is currently funded by the  
NSF, DARPA, NSA, and ARO. He received a National Science Foundation CAREER grant in  
2002 for work in peer-to-peer networking, a prestigious award for new faculty. In 2004, he was  
awarded a UMass Lilly Teaching Fellowship and, in 2007,  his college's Outstanding Teacher  
Award. In 2008, he received the Excellence in Science & Technology Alumni Award from the  
Univ. at Albany, where he received a B.S. in 1994. Levine is currently an associate editor of the  
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking journal.  
  
ADI MCABIAN, TWISTBOX  
  
Adi McAbian is Managing Director of Twistbox Entertainment and currently serves on the Board  
of Directors of Mandalay Media (MNDL), its parent.    
  
Since founding the company, Mr. McAbian has been responsible for facilitating strategic  
collaborations with over 60 mobile operators worldwide on content standards and minor  
protection, he has been a frequent speaker, lecturing on adult mobile content business and  
management issues throughout Europe and the U.S. including conferences organized by  
iWireless World, Mobile Entertainment Forum, and Informa.  
  
Mr. McAbian has worked with various operators including Vodafone’s Global Content Standards  
group on establishing best practices in minor protection for both content and contact services as  
well as local implementations of those standards and supporting platforms in the over a dozen  
local markets.  Mr. Mcabian also co-authored the Content Standards Rating Matrix currently used  
by nearly 100 networks to rate restricted content.  
  
Mr. McAbian is responsible for corporate strategy and carrier relationships that span the globe.  
  
Mr. McAbian's background includes experience as a successful entrepreneur and proven  
executive business leader with 12+ years as Business Development and Sales Manager in the  
broadcast television industry. Mr. McAbian is experienced in entertainment and media rights  
management, licensing negotiation and production, and has previously secured deals with  
AOL/Time Warner, Discovery Channel, BMG, RAI, Disney, BBC and Universal among others.  
  
Mr. McAbian currently serves on the Mobile Marketing Associations’ Consumer Best Practices  
Committee and  will chair the up coming Age Appropriate Content and Services Sub-Committee.   
  
RL “BOB” MORGAN, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON  
  
RL 'Bob' Morgan is Senior Technology Architect for the Computing & Communications  
Department at the University of Washington. In this role he contributes to designing,  
implementing, and documenting distributed computing and security infrastructure for the UW. He  
is the Chair of the Middleware Architecture Council for Education (MACE), providing guidance for  
the Internet2 Middleware Initiative. He is a primary contributor to a number of Internet2  
middleware projects, notably Shibboleth, a system for secure access to inter-institutional web  resources. He is also active in standards activities with the Internet Engineering Task Force  
(IETF) and the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS),  
where he has helped to develop the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Security  
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) standards.  
  
LAM NGUYEN, STROZ FRIEDBERG  
  
Lam Nguyen heads Stroz Friedberg’s Digital Forensics lab in Boston. With over 11 years of  
coding, database development and digital forensics experience for leading government and  
commercial entities, Mr. Nguyen is an industry leader in digital forensics for data breach, e-  
discovery, and cybercrime in civil and criminal litigation, as well as corporate investigations. Mr.  
Nguyen has investigated hundreds of criminal cases and has led forensic investigations in data  
breach and intrusion cases. He was the lead investigator in several searches for Personally  
Identifiable Information on lost and stolen computers for a large pharmaceutical company. Mr.  
Nguyen recently conducted a forensic examination of an employee’s computer for a large  
investment bank. That examination led to his testimony in federal court that helped prove the  
employee was engaged in insider trading.  
  
Before joining Stroz Friedberg, Mr. Nguyen was the Lead Computer Forensics Specialist for the  
United States Department of Justice, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section’s High Technology  
Investigative Unit. As the team leader, he initiated and developed online investigations of high-  
profile child exploitation cases; examined target computers seized in criminal investigations, and  
provided his expertise to federal prosecutors across the country. Mr. Nguyen is highly respected  
in the digital forensic community and has been qualified as an expert in federal court on a number  
of occasions.  
  
Sought after for his exceptional experience and commitment, he has trained law enforcement  
officers and trial attorneys on computer forensic issues domestically and abroad. Mr. Nguyen was  
an adjunct instructor at George Mason University for several years where he developed new  
courses and curricula on the subject of Computer Forensics and Network Security. More recently,  
he has been a guest lector at Harvard Law, Harvard Extension School, and the University of  
Massachusetts at Amherst.  
  
Mr. Nguyen’s dedication to public service has also included coordinating and delivering  
technology solutions critical to the operations of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, and Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Nguyen earned his Masters  
of Information Technology from American Intercontinental University and his undergraduate  
degree in Accounting Information Systems from Virginia Tech. He is certified in EnCase.  
  
JEFFREY SCHILLER, MIT  
                                                                       
JEFFREY I. SCHILLER received his S.B. in Electrical Engineering (1979) from the  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  As MIT Network Manager he has managed the MIT  
Campus Computer Network since its inception in 1984.  Prior to his work in the Network Group he  
maintained MIT's Multics timesharing system during the time-frame of the ArpaNet TCP/IP  
conversion.  He is an author of MIT's Kerberos Authentication system.  From 1994 through 2003  
Mr. Schiller was the Internet Engineering Steering Group's (IESG) Area Director for Security,  
responsible for overseeing security related Working Groups of the Internet Engineering Task  
Force (IETF).  He was responsible for releasing a U.S. legal freeware version of the popular PGP  
encryption program.  
  
Mr. Schiller is also responsible for the development and deployment of an X.509 based Public  
Key Infrastructure (PKI) at MIT. He serves as a consultant to other higher educational institution  
in the usage and deployment of PKI and related security technologies.    
Mr. Schiller is also a founding member of the Steering Group of the New England Academic and  
Research Network (NEARnet).  NEARnet, now part of Level3, is a major nationwide Internet  
Service Provider.  
  
DANNY WEITZNER, MIT  
  
Daniel Weitzner is Policy Director of the World Wide Web Consortium's Technology and Society  
activities. As such, he is responsible for development of technology standards that enable the  
web to address social, legal, and public policy concerns such as privacy, free speech, security,  
protection of minors, authentication, intellectual property and identification. Weitzner holds an  
appointment as Principal Research Scientist at MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence  
Laboratory, co-directs MIT's Decentralized Information Group with Tim Berners-Lee, and teaches  
Internet public policy at MIT.  
  
As one of the leading figures in the Internet public policy community, he was the first to advocate  
user control technologies such as content filtering and rating to protect children and avoid  
government censorship of the Intenet. These arguments played a critical role in the 1997 US  
Supreme Court case, Reno v. ACLU, awarding the highest free speech protections to the  
Internet. He successfully advocated for adoption of amendments to the Electronic  
Communications Privacy Act creating new privacy protections for online transactional information  
such as Web site access logs.  
  
Before joining the W3C, Mr. Weitzner was co-founder and Deputy Director of the Center for  
Democracy and Technology, a leading Internet civil liberties organization in Washington, DC. He  
was also Deputy Policy Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. He serves on the Boards of  
Directors of the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Software Freedom Law Center, the  
Web Science Research Initiative. and the Internet Education Foundation.  
  
His publications on technical and public policy aspects of the Internet have appeared in the Yale  
Law Review, Science magazine, Communications of the ACM, Computerworld, Wired Magazine,  
and The Whole Earth Review. He is also a commentator for NPR's Marketplace Radio.  
  
Mr. Weitzner has a degree in law from Buffalo Law School, and a B.A. in Philosophy from  
Swarthmore College.  
  
  
TAB OBSERVER BIOGRAPHIES  
  
RACHNA DHAMIJA, USABLE SECURITY SYSTEMS  
  
Dhamija’s research interests span the fields of computer security, human computer interaction  
and information policy. She received a Ph.D. from the School of Information Management and  
Systems at U.C. Berkeley in 2005. Her thesis focused on the design and evaluation of usable  
security systems. Previously, Dhamija worked on electronic payment system privacy and security  
at CyberCash. Her research has been featured in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal  
and the Economist.  
  
EVIE KINTZER, WGBH   
 
Evie Kintzer, is WGBH Educational Foundation's Director of Strategic Planning and Special  
Projects.  For the last eight years, Evie’s work with the President and Vice Presidents has  
included developing the Foundation’s strategic planning agenda, assessing implications of the  competitive environment, chairing WGBH’s Advanced Media Group, and advising and developing  
project strategy and operating plans.  Evie spent 13 years in the WGBH Legal Department as  
Director of Business Affairs and Deputy General Counsel, handling all of the business and legal  
affairs issues related to documentary programs produced by American Experience, NOVA, and  
FRONTLINE, as well as development of the Children’s Television and Interactive Departments.   
She holds a BA from Brandeis University and a JD from Hastings College of the Law.  
  
AL MARCELLA, WEBSTER UNIVERSITY  
  
Albert J. Marcella Jr., is president of Business Automation Consultants, LLC a global information  
technology and management-consulting firm providing information technology (IT) management  
consulting and IT audit and security reviews and training for an international clientele.    
  
Dr. Marcella is an internationally recognized public speaker, researcher, workshop and seminar  
leader with 30 years of experience in IT audit, security and assessing internal controls, and an  
author of numerous articles and 28 books on various IT, audit and security related subjects.    
  
Dr. Marcella’s most recent book Cyber Forensics: Collecting, Examining, and Preserving  
Electronic Evidence An Auditor’s Field Manual, second edition, focuses on issues, tools, and  
control techniques designed to assist audit, law enforcement, and info security professionals in  
the successful investigation of illegal activities perpetrated through the use of information  
technology.  
  
Professor Marcella is a tenured faculty member at Webster University in Saint Louis, MO, where  
he is responsible for teaching information technology management courses in the University’s  
graduate and doctoral programs.  
  
Dr. Marcella is the Institute of Internal Auditors Leon R. Radde Educator of the Year, 2000, Award  
recipient.  Dr. Marcella has taught IT audit seminar courses for the Institute of Internal Auditors,  
continues to teach for the Information Systems Audit and Control Association, and has been  
recognized by the IIA as a Distinguished Adjunct Faculty Member.  
  
JOHN MORRIS, CDT  
  
John B. Morris, Jr. is CDT's General Counsel, and the Director of its "Internet Standards,  
Technology and Policy Project." Prior to joining CDT in 2001, Mr. Morris was a partner in the law  
firm of Jenner & Block, where he litigated groundbreaking cases in Internet and First Amendment  
law. He was a lead counsel in the ACLU v. Reno/American Library Association v. U.S. Dep't of  
Justice case, in which the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Communications Decency  
Act of 1996 and extended to speech on the Internet the highest level of constitutional protection.  
In that case, Mr. Morris was responsible for the development of the factual presentation  
concerning how the Internet works, a presentation that served as the foundation for the Supreme  
Court's landmark decision.  
  
From May 1999 through April 2000, Mr. Morris served as director of CDT's Broadband Access  
Project (while on leave from his firm). The Project undertook a comprehensive assessment of the  
legal, policy, and factual issues surrounding the emergence of broadband Internet access  
technologies.  
  
Prior to becoming a lawyer, Mr. Morris had extensive experience with computers and politics. In  
the mid-1970's, as a staff member on Capitol Hill, he helped to promote the use of computer  
software to manage and improve constituent communications. In 1981, Mr. Morris joined a D.C.-  
area computer company, where he was one of the lead system designers of a constituent  
management software system for Members of Congress. In 1985, he co-founded Intelligent  Solutions, Inc., which developed the leading constituent services product used on Capitol Hill  
today.  
  
Mr. Morris received his B.A. magna cum laude with distinction from Yale University and his J.D.  
from Yale Law School, where he was the Managing Editor of the Yale Law Journal. Following law  
school, he clerked for Judge Thomas A. Clark of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, worked  
for three years as a staff attorney at the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta, Georgia,  
and then joined Jenner & Block in Washington in 1990.  
  
In addition to his work with CDT, Mr. Morris is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Cardozo Law  
School in New York City.  
 
TERESA PILIOURAS, POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY  
  
Teresa Piliouras is an Adjunct Professor in Computer and Information Science/Technology  
Management at Polytechnic University, where she has taught courses in network design,  
bioinformatics, network security, operations research, operations management, database design,  
and management of technology since 1994. The department participates in four interdisciplinary  
research centers and houses a number of departmental labs and research groups  
(http://www.poly.edu/cis/research/labs/index.php) which are funded by grants from government  
agencies such as the National Science Foundation, NASA, the Office of Naval Research, the Air  
Force, and the New York State Office of Science, Technology, and Academic Research, and  
private companies and foundations such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, the Sloan Foundation,  
Panasonic, Intel, and Verizon. The Information Systems and Internet Security (ISIS) Laboratory  
consists of heterogeneous platforms and multiple interconnected networks to facilitate  
experimentation in issues related to information security.  ISIS was designated an NSA Center of  
Excellence in 2002. It is currently further being expanded with an NSF Scholarship for Service  
(SFS) capacity building grant and is the host laboratory for Polytechnic University's SFS program.  
  
Dr. Piliouras is working on ways to protect children on the Internet and to promote public health.  
She is involved in a number of broad-based community outreach programs to bring seniors and  
“at-risk” youth together to address problems of health and wellness. This involves creating  
community wiki-webs designed to create a sense of support and community, especially among  
those who may have been marginalized in the past.  She is founder and President of Albright  
Associates, a company dedicated to protecting the privacy and safety of children in digital  
environments. Prior to Albright Associates, she was founder of TCR, Inc., a consulting company  
specializing in data mining and advanced intelligent technologies. She also held executive and  
technical positions at Accenture, Pitney Bowes, Boehringer Ingelheim, and Pepsico. She holds a  
Bachelor of Science from the University of Illinois, a Masters of Business Administration from Iona  
College, a Ph.D. from Polytechnic University, and a Postdoctoral Fellow from the Man-Machine  
Institute. She has authored numerous scholarly books and articles, including "Network Design:  
Management and Technical Perspectives" and "CRC Press Handbook of Modern  
Telecommunications."  
  
GREG RATTRAY, COL (RET), DELTA RISK  
  
Currently, Greg Rattray is a Principal, Delta Risk Consulting, establishing risk management  
strategies and cyber security capacity building approaches for government and private sector  
clients and advising the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) on  
approaches for enhancing global Internet security.  Previously, Greg served 23 years as an U.S.  
Air Force officer, retiring in summer 2007.   His assignments included Director for Cyber Security  
on the White House National Security Council staff, leading national policy development & NSC  
oversight for cyber security programs and oversight of Iraq telecommunication reconstruction.  He  
commanded the Operations Group of the AF Information Warfare Center responsible for global  operations of 900 personnel/$100 million active duty and National Guard team responsible for Air  
Force-wide tactics, red teams, exercising, test & training.  He served in a number of operational  
intelligence and information operations assignments from the unit to Headquarters, Air Force  
levels.  He also served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Deputy Director of the  
USAF Institute of National Security Studies at the Air Force Academy.  He is the author of  
numerous books and articles including Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, a seminal work in the  
cyber conflict field.  He received his Ph.D. from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts  
University, his Masters in Public Policy from J. F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard  
University and his B.S. from U.S. Air Force Academy.  He is a full member of the Council on  
Foreign Relations.  
  
JEFF SCHMIDT, CONSULTANT  
  
Jeff Schmidt is an independent security and technology risk consultant focusing on identity-  
related issues.  Previously, Jeff founded Secure Interiors (SI), an early provider of managed  
Internet security services, and Authis, a provider of innovative identity services for the financial  
vertical.  He managed both business to successful acquisition.  Jeff also assisted in the re-launch  
of Kleiner Perkins backed ENDFORCE (formerly SmartPipes) by managing their flagship product  
offering to initial revenue generation. ENDFORCE was subsequently acquired by Sophos.  Jeff  
also served as the CIO of The Ohio State University's second largest business unit and spent  
time at The Microsoft Corporation where he spearheaded Microsoft's first internal malicious  
testing of Windows 2000.  
  
Jeff is a founder and elected Director of the InfraGard National Members Alliance, the private  
sector component of the FBI's InfraGard Program (InfraGard is an FBI/private sector alliance  
dedicated to improving and extending information sharing between private industry and the  
government on matters of national security). Jeff helped the FBI create the InfraGard Program in  
1998 and has received commendations from the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and  
the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC - now a part of the Department of Homeland  
Security).  
  
On topics of computer security, Jeff is frequently interviewed and cited by numerous national  
publications and news outlets. He has authored several scholarly papers and has testified before  
state legislative bodies and the United States Congress. Jeff is a frequent speaker at major  
events such as Microsoft's DevDays, ITEC, ISSA, InfraGard, and Conference Board events.  
  
Jeff authored The Microsoft Windows 2000 Security Handbook, published by Que in four  
languages, and contributed to Using Windows NT 4.0, and Teach Yourself Linux in 10 Minutes,  
also published by Que. He received a BS CIS from The Ohio State University and an MBA  
Magna Cum Laude from the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University.  
  
JOHN SHEHAN, NCMEC  
  
John Shehan is the Director of Exploited Children Services (ECS) at the National Center for  
Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) in Alexandria, Virginia. He is responsible for policy  
decisions and the overall operations within the ECS. Mr. Shehan has been with NCMEC since  
February, 2000 and has participated in and presented at numerous law enforcement investigative  
training programs on high technology crimes, online child exploitation as well as investigative and  
analytical skill development. He has provided extensive technical assistance to law enforcement  
in the United States and abroad on cases of child sexual exploitation, especially Internet crimes  
against children. To raise awareness of online child sexual exploitation, he speaks regularly with  
media outlets such as the MSNBC, CBS World News, New York Times, CNN and others.    
  
Mr. Shehan is an active and founding member of the Financial Coalition Against Child  Pornography. He, along with other members at NCMEC collaborated to develop CyberTipline III.   
This system enables participating financial institutions and law enforcement to share information  
with an ultimate goal of eradicating the commercial viability of child pornography. John also  
spearheaded and manages the NetSmartz411 program. This program educates adults on all  
aspects of computers, the Internet and Internet safety.   
  
NCMEC's Exploited Children Services was established in 1996 by a mandate by the United  
States Congress.  ECS works collaboratively with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.  
Postal Service, U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Customs Service (now the Department  
of Homeland Security) in cases of child sexual exploitation.  ECS serves as a resource center for  
the public, parents, law enforcement, and others on the issues of the sexual exploitation of  
children.  ECS analysts process reports received on the sexual exploitation of children through  
the CyberTipline and disseminate the leads to federal, state, local and international law  
enforcement agencies for further investigation.  ECS analysts provide technical assistance to  
federal, state, local, and international law enforcement agencies investigating child sexual  
exploitation cases.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 to Appendix D: 
Submission Template 
 Internet Safety Technical Task Force  
Technology Submission Template 
Company Name / Individual 
http://www.website.com 
 
PLEASE SUBMIT BY JULY 21, 2008 
 
ABSTRACT 
This template describes the formatting and content 
requirements for submissions to the Internet Safety 
Technical Task Force’s Technical Advisory Board.  (This 
format should be familiar to any technologist who has 
submitted to ACM publications.)  Please follow the 
structure of the template below.   If necessary, please repeat 
information to accord with the template questions and 
layout. Please note: Your submission should be no longer 
than four pages including diagrams and bibliography. 
Keywords 
Provide 1-5 keywords to describe the submitted 
technology.  Sample keywords that might be useful in this 
context are: filtering, searching, identification, verification, 
parental controls, and forensics.   
 
Functional Goals 
Please  indicate  the  functional  goals  of  the  submitted 
technology by checking the relevant box(es): 
 Limit harmful contact between adults and minors 
 Limit harmful contact between minors 
 Limit/prevent minors from accessing inappropriate  
    content on the Internet 
 Limit/prevent minors from creating inappropriate  
    content on the Internet 
 Limit the availability of illegal content on the Internet 
 Prevent minors from accessing particular sites without     
    parental consent 
 Prevent harassment, unwanted solicitation, and  
    bullying of minors on the Internet 
 Other – please specify 
 
PROBLEM INTRODUCTION 
Briefly introduce the problem being addressed, citing any 
relevant studies.  Briefly introduce the proposed solution.  
If the submitted technology addresses multiple problems 
(e.g. has multiple goals per the subsection above), please 
list separately each problem-solution combination. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Describe the technical solution being proposed. Again if 
the technology addresses multiple problems with each a 
separate solution, please address each solution separately.  
This solution description should include enough detail to 
allow an assessment of whether or not the proposed 
solution could solve the problem being addressed.  The 
audience for this description will be computer scientists, 
security experts, and engineers.  When in question, the 
authors should err on the side of being more technical 
rather than less. The submission should resemble an 
ACM/IEEE submission in both style and substance. 
In Addition to the Above Description, Please Address 
Each of the Following: 
•  Describe  the  solution’s  technical  attributes,  e.g. 
features and functionality. 
•  Provide use cases. 
•  Specify  what  the  technology  successfully  solves  and 
what  it  does  not.  Describe  how  the  technology’s 
effectiveness is evaluated, measured, and tested. 
•  Provide a strengths-weaknesses analysis. 
•  Detail  the  implementation  requirements  (hardware, 
software, end user aptitudes). 
•  Describe the technical standards used in implementing 
the  proposed  technology  and  identify  the  standards 
bodies that are the home of existing or proposed future 
standards. 
•  Discuss the technology’s reliance and use of law and 
policy for success.  
•  Discuss the viability of the technology in both the US 
and international context.   
•  Detail  effectiveness  to  date.  Please  provide  any 
information possible on “failures” of the technology. 
 
EXPERTISE 
Describe the expertise of the company/developers. If 
appropriate, indicate other clients and products in this 
space. 
COMPANY OVERVIEW 
Please provide a description of the company including but 
not limited to information about founders and key team 
members, sources of capital, revenue (if relevant), customer 
base, growth, partnerships, participation in standards 
bodies, etc.  Information submitted in this section will vary 
depending on a company/organization’s stage in lifecycle.  
Our goal is to understand the context around the technology 
you have submitted for review. 
BUSINESS MODEL OVERVIEW 
Please discuss direct and indirect costs to all potential 
users.  Please also comment on distribution model to non-
profits, start-up sites and services, and other organizations 
that might not be able to afford full price for this 
technology.  Our goal is to understand financial accessibility and cost implications for all existing and new 
players. 
MORE INFORMATION 
Feel free to provide a URL that readers can go to for more 
information.  This may include videos, detailed specs, or 
anything else that might be relevant.  Indicate in this 
document what the readers might find if they go to the 
URL. This is a great place for information you would like 
to include that does not otherwise fit the structure of this 
document. 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
The final section of this document should contain basic 
contact information, including a contact name, email, 
phone number, and address for follow up.  Please send any 
relevant additional information about contacting the people 
listed here to tab@cyber.law.harvard.edu. 
CERTIFICATION  
At the end of your submission, you should include the 
following statement:  “I certify that I have read and agree to 
the terms of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force 
Intellectual Property Policy.” The IP Policy can be found at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/isttf/ippolicy. 
USE OF THIS DOCUMENT 
This document should not contain information that cannot 
be made available to the public.  (See Legal Notice below)  
This submission will be made available to the Technical 
Advisory Board, the Task Force, and the Attorneys 
General. Additionally, after initial review, submissions may 
be made public and published online for public 
commentary. Please note that you must be prepared, in any 
follow-up discussions on your submission with the Task 
Force, to provide sufficient, non-confidential details and 
explanation about how your technical solution works and 
upon what information it relies, in order to allow the Task 
Force meaningfully to evaluate your solution. 
 
NOTE:    THE  SUBMISSION  TEMPLATE  ENDS  HERE  -- 
FORMAT  INSTRUCTIONS  FOLLOW  BELOW.    PLEASE 
DELETE  THE  FORMAT  INSTRUCTIONS  FROM  YOUR 
DOCUMENT  PRIOR  TO  SUBMISSION.    THEY  DO  NOT 
COUNT  AS  PART  OF  THE  FOUR  PAGE  SUBMISSION 
LIMIT. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
FORMAT INFORMATION 
This template is modified from the template used by the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and, 
specifically, the Special Interest Group in Computer-
Human Interaction (SIGCHI). By conforming to this 
template, we are able to provide reviewers and the public 
with a collection of documents that allow for easy 
reviewing. 
All material on each page should fit within a rectangle of 
18 x 23.5 cm (7" x 9.25"), centered on the page, beginning 
1.9 cm (.75") from the top of the page, with a .85 cm (.33").  
Your submission should be no longer than four pages 
including diagrams and bibliography.  
Normal or Body Text 
Please use 10-point Times Roman font, or other Roman 
font with serifs, as close as possible in appearance to Times 
Roman in which these guidelines have been set. The goal is 
to have a 10-point text, as you see here. Please use sans-
serif or non-proportional fonts only for special purposes, 
such as distinguishing source code text. The Press 10-point 
font available to users of Script is a good substitute for 
Times Roman. If Times Roman is not available, try the font 
named Computer Modern Roman. On a Macintosh, use the 
font named Times. 
Title and Authors 
The title (Helvetica 18-point bold), authors' names (Times 
Roman 12-point bold) and affiliations (Times Roman 12-
point) run across the full width of the page – one column 
17.8 cm (7") wide.  
Abstract and Keywords 
Every submission should begin with an abstract of about 
100 words, followed by a set of keywords. The abstract and 
keywords should be placed in the left column of the first 
page under the left half of the title. The abstract should be a 
concise statement of the problem and approach of the work 
described. 
Subsequent Pages 
For pages other than the first page, start at the top of the 
page, and continue in double-column format. Right margins 
should be justified, not ragged. The two columns on the last 
page should be of equal length. 
 
References and Citations 
Use the standard Communications of the ACM format for 
references – that is, a numbered list at the end of the article, 
ordered alphabetically by first author, and referenced by 
numbers in brackets [1]. See the examples of citations at 
the end of this document. Within this template file, use the 
style named references for the text of your citation.   
References should be published materials accessible to the 
public. Internal technical reports may be cited only if they 
are easily accessible (i.e. you can give the address to obtain 
the report within your citation) and may be obtained by any 
reader. Proprietary information may not be cited. Private 
communications should be acknowledged, not referenced  
(e.g., “[Robertson, personal communication]”). 
 
Page Numbering, Headers and Footers 
Do not include headers, footers or page numbers in your 
submission.  SECTIONS 
The heading of a section should be in Helvetica 9-point 
bold in all-capitals. Sections should be unnumbered. 
Subsections 
The heading of subsections should be in Helvetica 9-point 
bold with only the initial letters capitalized. (Note: For sub-
sections and subsubsections, a word like the or a is not 
capitalized unless it is the first word of the header. 
Subsubsections 
The heading for subsubsections should be in Helvetica 9-
point italic with initial letters capitalized. 
 
FIGURES 
Figures should be inserted at the appropriate point in your 
text. Figures may extend over the two columns up to 17.8 
cm (7") if necessary. Each figure should have a figure 
caption in Times Roman. 
 
LANGUAGE, STYLE AND CONTENT 
Please write for a well-informed, technical audience, but try 
to make your submission as clear as possible: 
•  Briefly define or explain all technical terms. 
•  Explain  all  acronyms  the  first  time  they  are  used  in 
your text.  
•  Explain “insider” comments. Ensure that your whole 
audience understands any reference whose meaning you  
•  do not describe (e.g., do not assume that everyone has 
used a Macintosh or a particular application). 
•  Use  unambiguous  forms  for  culturally  localized 
concepts,  such  as  times,  dates,  currencies  and  numbers 
(e.g., “1-5- 97” or “5/1/97” may mean 5 January or 1 May 
, and “seven o'clock” may mean 7:00 am or 19:00). 
REFERENCES 
1.  Anderson, R.E. Social impacts of computing: Codes of 
professional ethics. Social Science Computing Review 
10, 2 (Winter 1992), 453-469. 
2.  CHI  Conference  Publications  Format.  Available  at 
http://www.acm.org/sigchi/chipubform/. 
3.  Conger., S., and Loch, K.D. (eds.). Ethics and computer 
use. Commun. ACM 38, 12 (entire issue). 
4.  Mackay,  W.E.  Ethics,  lies  and  videotape,  in 
Proceedings of CHI '95 (Denver CO, May 1995), ACM 
Press, 138-145. 
5.  Schwartz, M., and Task Force on Bias-Free Language. 
Guidelines  for  Bias-Free  Writing.  Indiana  University 
Press, Bloomington IN, 1995. 
 
The columns on the last page should be of equal length. 
PLEASE SUBMIT YOUR FINAL DOCUMENT AS A PDF 
LEGAL NOTICE 
The Berkman Center, the Task Force and Task Force members, and the Technical Advisory Board, including its 
members and affiliates, are under no obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the submitted abstracts or other 
materials  you  provide.    Please  do  not  submit  any  information  in  your  technical  abstract  that  is  confidential, 
proprietary or not for public dissemination. Please submit only information that you are willing to have made public. 
All  submissions  are  subject  to  the  Task  Force  Intellectual  Property  Policy: 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/isttf/ippolicy.  By submitting your abstract or proposal, you certify that you 
have read and agree to the terms of that Policy. 
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Intellectual Property Policy 
 Intellectual Property Policy 
for the Internet Safety Technical Task Force 
 
This IP policy is intended to state the manner in which intellectual property presented or 
submitted to the Task Force will be handled and to clarify that no confidentiality 
obligations will be imposed on Task Force members.   
 
No Confidentiality of Contributions 
No contribution or presentation by any Task Force member or non-member contributor to 
the Task Force regarding any research, technology or service (hereinafter “Submission”) 
will be treated as confidential.  Task Force members and the Technical Advisory Board, 
including its members and observers, shall have no duty to maintain the confidentiality 
of, and shall not execute or be subject to any confidentiality agreement for, such 
Submissions.  Contributors should not present, and the Task Force will not accept, any 
information in a Submission that is confidential, proprietary or otherwise not for public 
dissemination.  Contributors should submit only information that they are willing to have 
made public.  Contributors must be prepared, in any follow-up discussions with the Task 
Force or the Technical Advisory Board to their initial Submission, to provide sufficient, 
non-confidential details and explanation about how their proposed technology or service 
works and upon what information it relies to allow the Task Force meaningfully to 
evaluate their Submission; otherwise the Task Force may not be able to continue to assess 
that Submission and include it in any reports. 
 
Copyrighted Materials 
Task Force members and non-member contributors will retain copyright in their 
Submissions to the Task Force.  By providing your Submission to the Task Force, you 
are granting the Berkman Center and the Task Force a non-exclusive, royalty-free, 
perpetual, irrevocable and worldwide license to use your Submission for the sole 
purposes of carrying out the Task Force’s work and developing the Task Force’s reports, 
including, without limitation, the license rights to store, copy, distribute, transmit, 
publicly display, publicly perform, reproduce, edit, translate and reformat your 
Submission, and/or to incorporate it into a collective work.  The Berkman Center and the 
Task Force shall have no obligation to publish, disseminate, incorporate in Task Force 
reports, or make any other use of any Submission.    
 
Task Force members and non-member contributors understand that they may currently or 
in the future be developing internally information eligible for copyright, or receiving such 
information from other parties, that may be similar to the materials furnished in 
Submissions.  Participation in this Task Force shall not in any way limit, restrict or 
preclude any Task Force member from pursuing any of its present or future copyright 
activities or interests or from entering into any copyright agreement or business 
transaction with any person. 
 Patents 
Task Force members and non-member contributors will retain all pre-existing patent 
rights in their Submissions to the Task Force.  No license, express or implied, of any 
patent owned by the contributors disclosed during this Submissions process is granted.  
Task Force members and non-member contributors understand that they may currently or 
in the future be developing patentable information internally, or receiving patentable 
information from other parties, that may be similar to the patents disclosed during this 
process.  Participation in this Task Force shall not in any way limit, restrict or preclude 
any Task Force member from pursuing any of its present or future patent activities or 
interests or from entering into any patent agreement or business transaction with any 
person. 
 
Trade Secrets 
Because Task Force members and the Technical Advisory Board, including its members 
and observers, will be under no obligation to maintain the confidentiality of Submissions, 
any material that a contributor considers to be a trade secret or otherwise confidential or 
proprietary should not be submitted to the Task Force or the Technical Advisory Board.   
 
Intellectual Property Created by the Task Force 
All intellectual property in any Task Force report, except that in Submissions by Task 
Force members contained in such reports, shall be owned by the Berkman Center.  The 
Berkman Center will grant to each Task Force member an appropriate, non-exclusive, 
royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable and worldwide license to store, copy, distribute, 
transmit, publicly display, publicly perform, reproduce, edit, translate, and/or reformat 
the contents of any Task Force report for the purposes of facilitating or carrying out that 
member’s participation in the Task Force and activities related to the work of the Task 
Force.  
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Alphabetical List of Technology Submissions EXHIBIT 4 
SUBMISSION LIST 
1.  ALIAS 
2.  Appen Speech Langauge Technology: Data Stream Profiling 
3.  Appen Speech Language Technology:  Text Attribution Tool 
4.  Aristotle 
5.  AssertID 
6.  Been Verified  
7.  Chatsafe ‐ Carmichael Group 
8.  Chatsafe‐Crystal Reference Systems 
9.  CheckMyAge 
10. Choicepoint 
11. Covenant Eyes: Accountability  
12. CovenantEyes: Accountability and Fllter  
13. CredInt 
14. DeepNine 
15. eGuardian 
16. EthoSafe 
17. Gemalto 
18. GenMobi Technologies 
19. Icouldbe.org 
20. IDology 
21. Infoglide 
22. InternetSafety.com 
23. Keibi 
24. Kidsnet 
25. McGruffSafeGuard 
26. Microsoft 
27. Net Nanny  / Content Watch 
28. NetlDme 
29. Portcard 
30. Privo‐Parity: Privacy Vaults Online 
31. Privo‐Parity:KidCards 
32. PureSight 
33. RedStarhs 
34. RelyID 
35. Saferspace 
36. Sentinel: ADAPT 
37. Sentinel: SAFE 
38. Spectorsoft 
39. Symantec 
40. Verificage 
  